
Chapter 1: The Hypothesis
Sample Chapter 1 from the book
Vietnam is the next Tiger Economy of Asia, and it will grow and develop in a similar way to how South Korea and Taiwan grew as Tiger Economies of Asia.
When Nostradamus sat down to write The Prophecies in 1555, he was probably not trying to predict the future. More likely, he was simply on a mission to earn a living. He had already published several almanacs which were quite popular and this set the stage for his seminal work, a collection of major, long-term predictions told through quatrains (four-line poems). As it turned out, history was kind to Nostradamus. But even Nostradamus would probably agree that the future cannot be predicted. Sometimes things just happen. But other times, things happen for a reason or because a series of events has been set up so that something can happen in a particular way. In the case of Vietnam and as noted in this book’s preface, there is a long line of people offering theories and models of what Vietnam is doing, why, and what it will become. The authors believe that none of these models is individually correct and that the true path forward can only be understood by looking beyond the economic models and at the nation’s history, culture, government, religion, and geography, among other factors. Any serious analysis of a country like Vietnam must look at the past and the present, and only then can it look into the future. This is what we have done in this book.
Like every country on earth, Vietnam was tested during 2020 and 2021. The test was how well or how poorly the country managed the COVID-19 pandemic. Everyone, it seemed, was curious about the country’s growth and development. And for good reason.
The country’s GDP, trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), stock market, property market, and other economic and business metrics have grown consistently for more than two decades. For more than twenty consecutive years, Vietnam has exported commodities such as coffee, cashews, rice, crude oil, and a range of manufactured products to ports around the world. There are numerous bilateral trade agreements in place to provide the needed transparency in trade. As the extreme poverty rate declined significantly, the makings of a Vietnamese middle class emerged. Since at least the year 2000, the economy has been doing extremely well. It has also been fairly equitable. The country has been on a positive trend in terms of household income, living standards, and other metrics that measure the well-being of average Vietnamese citizens as opposed to a select elite. How this was happening and whether it would continue was unclear. As described in the preface, this was a key reason for writing this book. We wanted to learn how and why Vietnam will grow and for how much longer these growth trends might continue.
In Vietnam: Asia’s Rising Star, we are attempting to predict the future of Vietnam. We want to know what could happen from 2020 to 2050. We know the future cannot be reliably predicted, but we believe that ideas about the future can be identified and tested. If enough of our ideas are proven correct, they provide compelling evidence to answer the core hypothesis of this book which is: ‘Vietnam is the next Tiger Economy of Asia, and it will grow and develop in a similar way to how South Korea and Taiwan grew as Tiger Economies of Asia.’
There are two questions embedded within the hypothesis. The first is whether Vietnam is, or will, be a Tiger Economy. The second is whether Vietnam as a Tiger Economy can grow and develop in the same way that South Korea and Taiwan grew and developed when they were the Tiger Economies of Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. We cover the first question in detail in Chapter 7, and the second in Chapters 8–10. In brief, we employed two steps to address our hypothesis.
Step 1 was to define a set of metrics to measure whether Vietnam is a Tiger Economy. This would help us address the first part of the hypothesis. Step 2 was to propose a set of lenses that we use to measure how well or how poorly Vietnam as a Tiger Economy could replicate the South Korea and Taiwan growth model, assuming the first part of our hypothesis proved correct. We then applied these lenses to a series of ongoing themes related to Vietnam’s future. These themes are presented as case studies in Chapter 10.
-
We selected six criteria to measure whether Vietnam can credibly call itself a ‘Tiger Economy.’ Vietnam had to meet all or most of these metrics to be considered as such:
1. Numbers. Net growth for at least ten consecutive years (e.g., measurable outcomes such as GDP, FDI, trade, and foreign exchange reserves, have consistently grown for many years in a row).
2. Exports. Consistent movement up the value chain of manufactured products for export (e.g., the country’s factories consistently invest in and improve their operations to produce more sophisticated, higher margin, and more technical products for export and local consumption).
3. Industrialization. The foundations for the current and future industrial development and growth of the country are in place in terms of policy (e.g., an outward-looking free trade business environment, international competition rather than import substitution, openness to FDI, restructuring SOEs, a downward trend of agriculture’s share of GDP replaced by an upward trend of industry’s share of GDP, and other issues) and the country’s physical infrastructure is being built (e.g., roads, bridges, seaports, airports, and power generation) to facilitate industrial expansion.
4. Expertise. An expanding educated and highly skilled workforce (e.g., newly educated government workers and senior managers in the private sector are developing and implementing new management techniques while the workers who used to toil away on assembly lines to make shoes and garments are being trained to operate robotics and machinery with a much higher skill level).
5. Markets. Access to multiple global markets for Made-in-Vietnam products (e.g., locally made products are sold globally because the country has multiple free trade agreements with several countries in place as well as membership in global trading alliances).
6. Leaders. Strong leadership that is more a meritocracy than an oligarchy (e.g., while not always transparent, there are leadership changes that reflect a commitment to growth and development of the country rather than to an ideology or a dynasty).
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea obtained and met most of these criteria from the 1970s onwards. Those countries’ ability to accomplish these metrics were part of the reason they became Tiger Economies. The authors key question is whether Vietnam can also meet these criteria.
As noted in the preface, there were two primary reasons we selected South Korea and Taiwan as the comparative case study countries for this book as opposed to one of the other two Tigers or a different country, such as China or Japan. The first reason is a cultural argument, and the second a historical argument based on the success of the Tiger Economy countries in the 1980s and 1990s.
The cultural reason lies in our belief that all three countries—Vietnam, Taiwan, and South Korea—share Northeast Asian cultural traits. These cultural traits include a commitment to education, respect for authority, a mostly single ethnicity among its population, postwar grit, and a work ethic that not too many countries possess. We argue that Vietnam, on these issues and others, leans more towards the culture of China, Japan, and Korea than towards Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. China was ruled out due to its size (among other issues) and Japan was ruled out because its development, although similar to that of South Korea and Taiwan, happened a much longer time ago.
This left us with the four Tiger Economies of Asia. Hong Kong and Singapore were immediately ruled out because they were city-states and thus not useful comparatives, so only South Korea and Taiwan remained. This made sense because these two countries were prime examples of how to execute the East Asian Development Model of development, which led to both countries becoming high-income countries by the year 2000. They were poor and undeveloped in the 1950s and 1960s, just like Vietnam was up to the 1990s, but they achieved remarkable success over the four decades from 1960 to 2000.
Vietnam’s growth from 2000 to 2020 has told a similar story in terms of the growth of various metrics essential to the East Asian Development Model. This includes trade, foreign direct investment, local investment, foreign currency reserves, official development aid, and other measurable metrics. Vietnam achieved these metrics in a similar way to how South Korea and Taiwan met those same metrics in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Moreover, Vietnam has several advantages that South Korea and Taiwan did not have, such as agricultural wealth, oil and gas resources, advantageous geography, and a much larger population and thus workforce.
With this cultural and historical backdrop established, we then proposed a comparison of a twenty-year period of significant economic development for South Korea and Taiwan (1980– 2000) against a thirty-year period for Vietnam’s future (2020–2050). These were the reasons we selected these two former Asian Tiger Economies as our benchmarks and as part of our hypothesis for this book.
-
We researched and wrote six case studies on economic and social sectors, such as education, technology, the role of women, sports, tourism, cuisine, agriculture, and public works. These are presented in Chapter 10. By reviewing each case study through five lenses, we were able to determine whether the observations in the case studies either nudge Vietnam closer to or further away from affirming our hypothesis is correct. The lenses through which we viewed each of these case studies are briefly described below.
1. Culture. Vietnam lies in a unique position in Asia. It borders China, a predominantly Confucian Northeast Asian country, as well as Cambodia and Laos, two distinct Southeast Asian Buddhist nations. Thailand is quite close, as is the Philippines, two more distinct Southeast Asian nations. These neighbors are relevant when considering which types of economic development and strategy Vietnam might follow, but they are less comparable when culture characteristics are considered. Our hypothesis states that Vietnam will shape its growth and development like South Korea and Taiwan, two Northeast Asian countries, and therefore not along the lines of Southeast Asian nations. Will Vietnam follow an authoritarian Confucian model or an often-chaotic Buddhist model? Where does its culture lie and how does it support our hypothesis?
2. Technology. Technology can be transformative for any country. This has been the case since ideas and knowledge could be shared across borders. The greatest invention of the twentieth century, the internet, has connected the world in an unprecedented way, but not all countries have approached the internet in the same way. Some countries, such as China, have set up firewalls and other barriers to the internet while others have opened their doors wide. How receptive a country is to new technology and the flow of new ideas is sure to impact how that country will grow.
Vietnam has been relatively open to these types of IT and internet developments. In the 1980s and 1990s, South Korea and Taiwan did not have the internet, but they were quite open to whatever technology existed and imported it into their country. Is Vietnam’s openness to the internet and other technologies a good trend that will lead to positive outcomes? Will it attract the type of IT talent and entrepreneurship that so many countries in the world desire as the world gets increasingly more connected online? The test within each case study is to identify whether the path Vietnam has taken in respect to accessing and adopting technology significantly supports its future growth.
3. Environment. Environmental changes are affecting the future of every country in the world. In the past, significant economic development has been achieved most often through the exploitation of natural resources rather than preservation, and there was little regard given to the negative impacts to the environment. This is no longer an option. Increasingly, people around the world are waking up to the fact that continuing down this development path is no longer sustainable if humans are to remain on this planet.
As a fast-developing, low-lying coastal country, Vietnam is much more vulnerable to environmental issues than many countries. In some cases, such as waste management and power generation, Vietnam can tackle the causes head on. In other cases, such as rising sea levels due to global warming, it is on the defensive and paying the price for the past actions of other countries. A recent climate report published by Climate Central, an American science organization that researches climate change and its impact on the public, revealed that most of the Mekong Delta, the country’s ‘rice basket,’ will be under water by 2050 due to rising sea levels.
It is hard to be optimistic on this issue. Whatever the tangible impacts, all countries must prepare for an uncertain world due to climate change, not to mention keeping their environment clean and safe for its citizens. Forty years ago, South Korea and Taiwan could choose to deal with or ignore much of the environmental impact of growing their economies. Vietnam does not have the same choice, but will it solve its environmental challenges? Can it adopt or find new environmental technologies better than other countries? Will it become a victim or a strong survivor of climate change? The real challenge this lens explores is not whether environmental factors will help Vietnam grow but whether they will hinder its growth.
4. Policy. Since the introduction of Doi Moi at the 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1986, the Party has seemed willing to endorse policies that keep opening Vietnam’s doors and windows ever wider. Vietnam is already one of the ‘most globalized’ countries in the world.3 It relies heavily on free trade and investment from outside to drive its economy. This is unlike China or Japan, which consider themselves large enough or strong enough to have their own markets. Perhaps for this and other reasons, import barriers are set up. They need less from outside markets.
Vietnam is different. For better or worse, it has fully embraced all that free trade and globalization have to offer and the government has put these intentions into policy. For example, this embrace is apparent in the foreign investment law and in the many free trade agreements and groups that the country has joined. Is this the right move? Can Vietnamese leaders reverse course if they need or want to, or have they passed the point of no return? What kind of policies were put in place by South Korean and Taiwanese leaders in the 1980s and 1990s? How much FDI did they allow in? This lens looks at whether there is evidence in the case studies that Vietnam will take advantage of the progressive policies that are already in place and whether similar new policies will continue to be adopted.
5. Governance. There are several reasons why countries get stuck at a certain economic and social level and/or remain poor. One of the most common is the inability of the government in power to govern effectively. This might be due to a weak legal infrastructure that leads to too many gray areas that result in corruption as the only means of getting something done. Sometimes there is an effort among elites to go slow on policies and projects that threaten their status quo—the status quo that has made them rich—and they want to maintain it even if it means the rest of the country remains poor. A small payoff to offload a container at the port is corruption, but it has a limited impact. A year-long delay in the development of a large infrastructure project because bureaucrats are intent on steering the construction contracts to certain individuals and companies is much more devastating for a country that wants to maintain its growth trends. We collectively label these issues as governance.
Governments create, pass, and implement policies, but they are not monolithic entities. They are composed of a large group or groups of individuals making hundreds of individual decisions, sometimes with limited resources or knowledge and often with numerous opportunities for self-interest. Reducing corruption and the application of laws for the good of all the people is particularly thorny as it relies on strong leadership that focuses on positive outcomes for the entire country rather than a chosen elite.
In less than fifty years South Korea and Taiwan achieved remarkable success. This is the reason we chose them as our comparative case study countries. The term ‘Asian Economic Miracle’ emerged from their success, as did the label ‘Tiger Economy.’ Thus, it is worth analyzing how South Korea and Taiwan achieved success because they offer viable development models.
Would Nostradamus have approved of our approach? Comparing Vietnam’s growth model today to the successful growth models of two countries in the 1980s and 1990s? Long essay-style case studies instead of quatrains? Who knows and who cares? The business of predicting the future is not for the faint of heart nor the thin of skin. The authors are neither of those things, nor are we clairvoyant. In the best way we could, we were simply trying to better understand this country as it moves through the 2020s and what it might look like by the year 2050.
The hypothesis made sense, and so that is how we began this research project. However, by the Tet holidays of 2020, we had to rethink our approach to describing what was happening in Vietnam. Everything had suddenly become much more complicated, and not just in Vietnam. The entire world had changed.
-
During the initial research and first draft writing stages of this book project (January–April 2020), the world changed. A coronavirus, more commonly known as COVID-19, started in Wuhan China at the end of 2019 and within three months exploded into a pandemic that circled the globe. In April and May 2020, most of the world was in some form of lockdown. It was as if the world had stopped spinning and stopped orbiting the sun. By the end of 2022, there were more than 655 million COVID-19 cases worldwide, which resulted in 6.7 million deaths according to the World Health Organization. More than three years later (2023), COVID can be written about in the past tense for most countries, including Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, there were two sets of challenges, which we refer to as COVID I (February 2020 to April 2021) and COVID II (May 2021 to March 2022).
Vietnam’s battle against COVID I was very successful. Despite the country’s proximity to the epicenter in Wuhan China, there were only around 1,500 cases and just 35 deaths in Vietnam due to COVID-19 by the end of 2020. This happened because the Vietnamese government quickly put together a plan. At the beginning of February 2020, the border with China and all flights to and from China were shut down. Schools were closed and online classes for students started after the Tet holidays (Tet was on 25 January 2020). Taxi companies closed. Essential businesses (i.e., grocery stores, pharmacies, medical clinics, etc.), positioned guards at the door who checked your temperature and ensured that you were wearing a mask before allowing you in. Testing, aggressive contact tracing, and quarantining of specific locations—neighborhoods, apartment buildings, and even entire villages— were widespread anywhere there was a perceived threat. On around March 15, 2020, international commercial flights into Vietnam ceased and did not resume until two years later. Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc of Vietnam announced a national lockdown for the entire month of April 2020.
Vietnam has had to do this kind of mass mobilization before and is adept at it. The country showed its resolve while many other countries faltered and thousands of their citizens died. The government’s quick and decisive response paid off and there was even optimism among the Vietnamese public. Between April 3 and April 19, 2021, the Singapore-based social research agency Blackbox Research and Toluna surveyed 12,500 people from twenty-three countries about their leaders’ response to the pandemic. The survey measured four key indicators: national political leadership, corporate leadership, community, and the media. Out of a score of 100 points, the global average was 45. Only seven nations rated their leadership above 50 percent. China led the survey with a score of 86 followed by Vietnam with a score of 77. Taiwan’s leadership earned a score of 50 while South Koreans gave their leaders a low score of 31.5
As the world began to rebound from COVID-19, Vietnam was considered one of the countries that was going to be ready to move forward quickly. Its citizens were healthy, its medical system had not collapsed, and manufacturers from China and other countries were lining up to move in and set up operations in the country that had proven itself against COVID-19. But then Vietnam’s world changed again with the arrival of COVID II (the Delta and later the Omicron variants) in May 2021.
COVID II posed a more significant challenge. By August and September 2021, the daily death count was in the hundreds. Triage hospitals had to be set up and new policies—Directive 15 and Directive 16—called for strict lockdowns, even a total ban on people leaving their homes. The military was called in to help enforce the ban with roadblocks and assist with food deliveries and testing. In July 2021, the government launched a vaccination program and immediately faced two problems. First, it did not have an adequate supply of vaccines. The government initially sought to rely on COVAX, the World Health Organization’s vaccine distribution program, but quickly recognized that this would take too long to get the supplies it needed. Instead, it worked with the private sector to sign deals with companies in other countries to get enough vaccines into the country. Second, the government had to set up a vaccination program from scratch. The various vaccines that were obtained were distributed in an ad hoc and often chaotic manner. However, in a brief period, order prevailed. Vietnam’s first focus was to deliver vaccines to essential services, factory workers, and businesses deemed essential to supporting the economy. For many Vietnamese, the impact of an economic crisis could have been worse than COVID itself. Over the previous thirty years, the country had worked hard to reduce its severe poverty rate and a return to that environment was not an option. By the end of March 2022, virtually everyone in the country over eighteen years old had been fully vaccinated and 50 percent of the population had received three vaccine shots.
In early October 2021 the government also announced Resolution 128 which called for a ‘safe and flexible adaptation and effective control over the COVID-19 pandemic.’ The more common reference to this resolution was that Vietnam had made the decision to ‘live with COVID’ rather than try to pursue a ‘zero COVID’ policy. To that end, the government announced that the country would begin to open in October. This was a mere four months after the vaccination program had started.
None of these government programs and campaigns were perfect, nor did they protect everyone or every community, but they showed the pragmatic nature of not just the government but also the people. There was never any groundswell of an antivaccination campaign as there had been in many other countries. There was a frank recognition that the country could withstand the kind of extended case counts and death tolls that so many other countries experienced. At the same time, the country could not withstand being closed for an extended period because too many people rely on a daily wage for survival. They were simply too poor to take so much time off work. They had to go back to work so the country had to learn to live with COVID. Thus, the citizens of the country agreed to the lockdowns, agreed to the gradual reopening, maintained social distance guidelines, wore masks, and most importantly got vaccinated.
COVID-19 provided an opportunity to analyze and report on a real-time crisis that Vietnam had to deal with. It was a perfect test of the hypothesis. Had the country failed to deliver during this time of crisis, our hypothesis might have been totally negated or at a minimum poorly chosen. However, the results achieved through COVID I and COVID II showed that our hypothesis remains valid. It is likely to strengthen our understanding of where Vietnam is heading. We have tested our hypothesis in multiple ways for this book and we begin, in the next chapter, with some historical evidence which shows that dealing with crises is something that Vietnam has been doing for centuries.
Interested in learning more? Click the link to make an order